Turkmen Terzi
Image: Journalist
By Turkmen Terzi
This trajectory did not begin with the current crisis. In fact, it can be traced back to the unintended consequences of American interventions in the early 2000s. When the United States toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, it eliminated Iran’s two most dangerous enemies. Washington did not intend to empower Tehran, but the result was exactly that. Iran was the one actor most prepared for the chaos that followed regime change. It had spent decades building networks, cultivating allies, and preparing for regional instability.
By the mid 2010s, Iran’s influence stretched across what many analysts called a “corridor of power” from Tehran to the Mediterranean. Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana’a all hosted governments or armed movements aligned with Iran. This expansion was not accidental. It reflected long term planning and a willingness to invest in alliances that others neglected. While many regional governments reacted to crises, Iran prepared for them.
But success created backlash. As Iran’s footprint expanded, so did the fears of its rivals. Israel viewed Iran’s growing military presence in Syria and Lebanon as a direct security threat. Gulf Arab states saw Tehran’s influence in Yemen and Iraq as an attempt to encircle them. Türkiye worried that Iran’s rise would limit its own regional ambitions. Gradually, these concerns converged into a shared perception: Iran was no longer just another regional player; it was becoming the dominant one.
That perception changed the strategic equation. The turning point came after October 7, 2023. While global attention focused on the war between Israel and Hamas, the broader regional consequences were far more significant. Israel began systematically targeting not only Hamas but also the wider network of groups linked to Iran. Hezbollah’s leadership suffered heavy losses. Iranian aligned militias came under sustained pressure. Syria, long considered Iran’s most important regional ally, became increasingly unstable.
By late 2024, a coordinated effort involving the United States, Israel, and regional partners effectively pushed Iran out of key positions in Syria. This was not a minor tactical shift. Syria had served as Iran’s strategic bridge to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Losing that bridge weakened Tehran’s ability to support its allies and project power beyond its borders. More importantly, it signalled something larger: the beginning of a new phase in regional strategy.
Over the past three decades, one pattern has repeated itself. Governments and movements that once challenged American and Israeli influence have gradually disappeared or been weakened. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq collapsed in 2003. Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya fell in 2011. The long standing Syrian regime lost much of its authority after years of war. Even non state actors that once defined regional resistance have been reduced in power or forced to adapt.
Whether this pattern resulted from deliberate planning or historical coincidence is open to debate. But the cumulative effect is clear. One by one, the obstacles to American and Israeli dominance in the Middle East have been removed. Today, only one major state remains capable of resisting that dominance: Iran.
That reality explains the language increasingly used by Israeli leaders. After the October 7 attacks, Israeli officials described Iran as the “head of the octopus,” while its regional allies were merely the tentacles. The strategy that followed reflected this metaphor. First weaken the tentacles. Then confront the head.
From Israel’s perspective, Iran represents more than a geopolitical rival. It is seen as a potential existential threat. Iran’s missile arsenal, regional alliances, and ideological hostility toward Israel make it a uniquely dangerous adversary. For the United States, Iran challenges the stability of a regional order built around American partnerships and security guarantees. For Gulf Arab states, Iran’s ambitions threaten their sovereignty and internal security.
When multiple actors share the same threat perception, cooperation becomes easier, even among former competitors.
This convergence of interests is why recent military strikes against Iranian targets should not be viewed as isolated incidents. They are part of a broader strategy aimed at gradually weakening Iran’s regional capabilities. The objective is not necessarily immediate regime change. Instead, it is the steady erosion of Iran’s power, military, political, and economic, until it can no longer shape events beyond its borders.
In other words, the campaign is likely to be long term.
Future operations will probably take many forms: precision airstrikes, cyberattacks, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. None of these actions alone will decide the outcome. But together, they can reduce Iran’s influence step by step. This approach avoids the risks of a full scale war while still pursuing strategic advantage.
The key question is not whether the pressure will continue. It is how far it will go. History suggests that once a coalition forms around a shared security objective, it rarely stops halfway. The removal of Iranian forces from Syria demonstrated that coordinated action can produce tangible results. That success may encourage further operations aimed at limiting Iran’s reach in Iraq, Lebanon, and beyond.
For policymakers in Washington and Tel Aviv, the logic is straightforward. As long as Iran retains the capacity to dominate regional politics, the threat remains. Neutralizing that capacity, rather than destroying the state itself, has become the central strategic goal.
This is why the current trajectory matters.
The Middle East is entering a period of sustained confrontation in which Iran stands as the final major challenger to a U.S. and Israel backed regional order. The conflict may not resemble traditional wars of the past. It will unfold through incremental pressure, strategic strikes, and shifting alliances. But its direction is increasingly clear.
The United States and Israel are unlikely to stop until Iran is no longer able to project decisive power across the region.
The ceasefire announced this week looks less like peace and more like a pause in an unfinished campaign. Missiles still fly, the Strait of Hormuz remains contested, and the core disputes over Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities are unresolved. For Washington and Israel, diplomacy may buy time, but the strategic objective has not changed: neutralizing Iran’s threat. Until that goal is met, ceasefires will remain temporary breaks, not true endings to the conflict.
*Türkmen Terzi is a foreign journalist based in South Africa.